RISK ASSESSMENT ALGORITHMS: THE ANSWER TO AN INEQUITABLE BAIL SYSTEM?

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Debate over pretrial detention began long before ratification of the Eighth Amendment, tracing its roots to the early English bail system. Despite this, approaches to the system have largely remained stagnant since passage of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, which contains a series of procedural directives that model bail-setting practices for the majority of jurisdictions today. However, many courts have begun to insinuate that the current methods represent a flawed, archaic, and biased system—burdening both defendants and the community. A rise in the use of algorithms in other areas of the criminal justice system has led some jurisdictions, including Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, to abandon traditional procedures in favor of data-driven risk assessment tools, yielding promising results for the future of bail reform.

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I. INTRODUCTION

“Excessive bail shall not be required.” While the opening words to the Eighth Amendment may—at face value—appear quite clear, their meaning has sparked a wide variety of interpretations from both scholars and courts for decades. Despite the language of the Eighth Amendment, developed case law affirms the principle that an individual does not possess a constitutional right to be released on bail. But for whom is this provision intended? In the federal system, certain defendants found guilty of crimes enumerated in the Bail Reform Act of 1984 may be statutorily barred from release. On the opposite end of the spectrum are defendants who remain detained pretrial, not because of the severity of their crime or the risk they present to the community, but due to a systemic flaw in the

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1 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
3 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3) (2012). The Bail Reform Act of 1984 enhanced protections for defendants held in custody solely for failure to satisfy monetary conditions for release. However, the Act stipulates that it is presumed no conditions are appropriate to ensure a defendant’s appearance or the safety of the community if an individual has been charged with any of the enumerated offenses listed in the subsection. The most notable exceptions include offenses with a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more, specific crimes involving minor victims, and drug trafficking activities. Id.
traditional bail system as it stands today—they simply cannot afford release.\(^4\) In searching for an equitable solution to bail reform that maintains public safety, risk assessment algorithms\(^5\) have risen to the forefront of the discussion. These algorithms seek to reform existing methods of pretrial release by lowering crime rates and reducing jail populations while enhancing judicial efficiency in the process.

This Recent Development argues in favor of an algorithmic approach to bail reform and introduces the steps that may be taken to correct inequities in the pretrial release system utilized by the majority of jurisdictions today. Part II provides a brief history of the bail system and the emergence of algorithms as part of the criminal process. Part III assesses the real-world effectiveness and impact of bail algorithms through Mecklenburg County’s implementation of the Arnold Foundation’s Public Safety Assessment. Part IV outlines the benefits of employing bail algorithms, while also recognizing the possibility of bias and systemic limitations in the methods themselves. Finally, Part V concludes by identifying future policy measures to effectively utilize algorithms in bail reform efforts.

II. THE EMERGENCE OF ALGORITHMS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

Modern practices of setting bail reached a plateau with the enactment of the Bail Reform Act of 1984.\(^6\) “Bail schedules,” which standardize monetary amounts of bail “based on the offense charged, regardless of the characteristics of an individual


\(^5\) Risk assessment algorithms are tools used to predict future behavior among incarcerated defendants. In the criminal justice system, these algorithms are chiefly used to narrowly estimate an individual’s likelihood of committing new criminal activity and assess risk of flight. See Vignesh Ramachandran, Exploring the Use of Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System, STANFORD ENGINEERING (May 3, 2017), https://engineering.stanford.edu/magazine/article/exploring-use-algorithms-criminal-justice-system.

defendant,”7 have been utilized as the predominant mechanism governing pretrial detention procedures and have remained unchallenged for nearly half a century.8 Although these schedules seem to promote equal treatment of defendants, they have nonetheless come under attack for failing to effectively satisfy the aims of pretrial detention outlined in the Bail Reform Act.9 The use of algorithms as a tool to assess the risk of individual defendants pending trial has gained support in numerous “pilot” jurisdictions throughout the country10 and now begs the question of whether nation-wide adoption is the next logical step in bail reform efforts. The answer to this question requires reviewing the history of bail and the shortcomings of the existing system.

A. Brief History and Criticism of Modern Practices for Setting Bail

Historically, determining an appropriate amount for bail pending trial has neither been restricted nor monitored.11 Although the Eighth Amendment’s “prohibition against excessive bail applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment,”12 in its early years, the clause was applied broadly and afforded little judicial oversight as to what amount was considered “excessive.”13 It was not until the 1950s, in

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8 Id.
9 See id.
10 Initial pilot sites testing the effectiveness of the Arnold Foundation’s risk assessment tool included: several counties in Arizona; multiple courts in Colorado; the state of Kentucky; Santa Cruz County, California; and Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. Press Release, Arnold Found., Laura and John Arnold Foundation Announces New Pilot Sites for Court Risk Assessment Tool (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/home-foundation-areas-focus-resources -grants-team-jobs-contact-us-laura-john-arnold-foundation-announces-new-pilot-sites-court-risk-assessmen/.
13 See Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1326–27.
the landmark case *Stack v. Boyle*,\(^{14}\) that the Supreme Court held that defendants have a right to challenge the amount of bail set if the allocation is significantly higher than the usual amount in comparable cases.\(^{15}\) This decision promoted the standardization of bail through the formation of the bail schedule, a judicially created listing of presumptive bail amounts for certain offenses used in the majority of jurisdictions, both state and federal, today.\(^{16}\) These schedules may “formally be promulgated through state law, or informally employed by local officials.”\(^{17}\) The exact terms of bail schedules vary in providing maximum and minimum allocations for each offense.\(^{18}\) In varying jurisdictions, the legislature either mandates that the stipulated amount be utilized or the amount is provided as a suggestion to the judicial official while they exercise their discretion in deciding the actual amount.\(^{19}\) Ultimately, these bail schedules helped address the concerns of the *Stack* Court by reigning in the wide disparity in bail amounts between defendants with comparable charges, while simultaneously affording judges some degree of variance within the maximum-minimum band when setting bail, given the individual circumstances of each case and defendant.\(^{20}\)

The Bail Reform Act of 1966 (“1966 Act”) was the first in a series of congressional acts aimed at reforming pretrial bail procedure, which resulted in the release of more defendants pretrial while creating a “rationale that allowed for increased detention.”\(^{21}\) The 1966 Act sought to continue the trend of individualized discretion set forth in *Stack*, requiring judicial officers to review defendants’ conditions of release after defendants are held in custody for a twenty-four hour period.\(^{22}\) While in some respects

\(^{14}\) 342 U.S. 1 (1951).

\(^{15}\) Id. at 4.

\(^{16}\) See Allen, *supra* note 7.

\(^{17}\) Id. at 641 (quoting Lindsey Carlson, *Bail Schedules: A Violation of Judicial Discretion?*, 26 CRIM. JUST. 12, 13 (2011)).

\(^{18}\) See id.

\(^{19}\) See id. at 642.

\(^{20}\) See *Stack*, 342 U.S. at 4; Allen, *supra* note 7, at 642.


promoting individual review, the 1966 Act also allowed for the continued pretrial detention of defendants who were unable to satisfy the imposed conditions, so long as that detention did “not amount to punishment or otherwise violate the Constitution.”

However, the looming question of what constituted “punishment” in the context of pretrial detention remained unanswered in the decades following the reform legislation.

The most recent major federal reform effort for procedure-driven pretrial detention came with the passage of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (“1984 Act”). The 1984 Act made several key changes to the practice of setting bail post-Stack and the 1966 Act, including: prohibitions on the practice of imposing absurdly high bail amounts in an effort to detain defendants, formally authorizing courts to consider the danger a defendant may pose to the community or to specific individuals, and providing hearings to defendants as a requirement of pretrial detention. The 1984 Act is designed to reasonably ensure a defendant will appear in court and will not “endanger the safety of any other person or the community” pending trial.

Opponents of the 1984 Act viewed its provisions of statutorily authorizing the detention of an individual presumed innocent as a violation of a defendant’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. This element of the 1984 Act was quickly challenged in United States v. Salerno as being facially unconstitutional. Writing for a 6-3 majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that pretrial detention may serve as “a potential solution to a pressing societal

23 Id. at 473–74.
24 See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 281 (1984) (holding a New York statute authorizing the detention of juveniles who posed a “serious risk” to the community was compatible with due process under the “fundamental fairness” test and was not in fact punitive).
26 See id. § 3142(c)(1)(B).
27 See id. § 3142(c)(1).
28 See id. § 3142(e)(1).
29 Id. § 3142(b).
31 Id. at 739.
32 Id. at 741.
problem,” permitting the Government to detain an arrestee pending trial if it is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that no release conditions would reasonably assure public safety. Since *Salerno*, the “potential solution” endorsed by the Court has resulted in numerous forms of release, pending trial. A defendant may be released from pretrial custody by posting a full cash bond, by being granted an unsecured bond or conditional release, or by the most “traditional” form of bail—through a surety bond backed by a professional bond company. In cases involving release through a surety bond, the bail bonding company “signs a promissory note to the court for the full bail amount and then charges the defendant a percentage of that full amount as a fee.” A professional bond company charges defendants a non-refundable fee (ordinarily ten percent of the total bond set by the court) to secure their release pending trial. If a defendant fails to appear for their court date, the bond is revoked, and the “bounty hunters” are used to recapture the absconding offender. This aspect of the modern bail system is the subject of a high degree of criticism from both scholars and judicial officials. The privatization of pretrial release and financial incentives for recapture create a “system [which] discriminates as bail bondsmen remain part of the political process, with interests antithetical to those of the accused.” The system is further compromised as often defendants’ only option for release pending trial is to turn to a bail bonding company. Defendants who

33 *Id.* at 747.
34 *Id.* at 752.
35 See COHEN ET AL., supra note 12, at 105–09.
36 A full cash or surety bond requires the defendant to pay the Court the full amount in cash before being released from custody. An unsecured bond allows for immediate release upon the defendant’s promise to pay the set amount in full in the event they fail to appear for their next court date. Conditional release occurs when a judicial official stipulates restrictions on the defendant’s release (such as no contact orders or restrictions on travel), on which violation of these conditions results in revocation of bail and re-arrest. *Id.*
37 *Id.* at 106.
38 See *id*.
39 See *id.* at 107.
41 *Id.*
are unable to satisfy their bond conditions remain in custody with significant costs to the court system and community alike. These resulting consequences include a rise in recidivism, correlating to the length of a defendant’s incarceration (with as high as a 51% greater likelihood of reoffending), higher jail populations increasing costs to taxpayers in the community, and a flooded court system hampering efforts to maintain an efficient judiciary. These criticisms of the current system have led many jurisdictions to seek more beneficial alternatives to the traditional offense-driven bail schedule for the benefit of all actors involved, except for bail bonding companies. Algorithms have emerged as one of these alternatives, providing a reliable tool for thoroughly analyzing a defendant’s risk of flight and danger to the community, and supporting a more efficient, equitable bail determination procedure in the process.

B. Rethinking Risk Assessment Factors Through the Use of Algorithms

“One of the most striking innovations in the criminal justice system during the past thirty years has been the introduction of

42 Low-risk defendants remaining in custody for two to three days are “almost 40 percent more likely to commit new crimes before trial than equivalent defendants held no more than 24 hours.” This recidivism rate climbs to 51 percent when a defendant is held for eight to fourteen days. DR. CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP ET AL., THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 3 (2013), https://www.pretrial.org/download/research/The%20Hidden%20Costs%20of%20Pretrial%20Detention%20-%20LOJAF%202013.pdf.

43 See Brookland & Stasio, supra note 4 (noting Mecklenburg County’s cost of $166 to hold defendants in custody, resulting in $113 million spent on inmate housing in 2014).


actuarial methods—statistical models and software programs—designed to help judges and prosecutors assess the risk of criminal offenders.”46 These algorithms rely on a set order of operations similar to a mathematical equation.47 These computer-generated formula-based methods have been employed to a limited degree in four main areas of the criminal justice system, including: “pretrial and bail, sentencing, probation and parole, and juvenile justice.”48

A policy paper adopted by the Conference of State Court Administrators likened risk assessment algorithms to the statistical analysis utilized by Oakland A’s general manager Billy Beane, as depicted in Michael Lewis’s book, Moneyball.49 Beane’s algorithmic approach was discounted by the greater baseball community for failing to abide by “long-held practices based on intuition and gut-feelings, tradition, and ideology.”50 Similarly, opponents of risk assessment algorithms remain skeptical of its long-term effectiveness, instead clinging to traditional methods of determining pretrial release.51 However, just as Beane’s new method turned out to be a more accurate predictor of baseball talent, algorithms allow for a more accurate assessment of a defendant’s flight risk and danger to the community to be ascertained in the bail determination process, despite their departure from the traditional practice of following a bail schedule.

Further, the similar application of algorithms used for what some jurisdictions have deemed “predictive policing” has recently been subject to a high degree of scrutiny due to its implications on Fourth

48 DATA & CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 46.
50 Id.
Amendment issues related to reasonable suspicion.52 “Promoted as the next smart policing weapon in the war on crime,” proponents claim these algorithms will “predict crime before it happens.”53 Evaluated in this context, “[p]redictive algorithms are not magic boxes that divine future crime, but instead probability models of future events based on current environmental vulnerabilities.”54 Critics believe the new technology55 could lead to a society analogous to the police state illustrated in the movie Minority Report.56 More legalistic concerns arise when examining the algorithm’s effect on an individual’s protections and liberties granted by the Fourth Amendment.57 Despite concerns arising from the use of algorithms in the policing process, their value as a supplemental tool to analyze a defendant’s risk of flight and danger to the community should not be underestimated.

In the last few years, numerous jurisdictions have begun implementing some form of risk assessment algorithm into their bail determination procedures on a trial basis, including the entire states of Kentucky, New Jersey, and Arizona, as well as the District of


53 “[P]redictive policing uses the power of ‘big data’ to isolate patterns in otherwise random acts.” By using information gathered from specific occurrences such as arrests and incident reports, cross-referenced with other variables such as the addresses of known gang members, past calls for service to law enforcement, and areas of frequent violent activity. Id. at 261, 265–66.

54 Id. at 314.


56 Minority Report is a neo-noir science-fiction movie directed by Steven Spielberg and starring Tom Cruise, in which crime is eradicated due to the “Precrime” police unit’s ability to predict crimes before they occur. MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox 2002).

57 See Katherine Freeman, Recent Development, Algorithmic Injustice: How the Wisconsin Supreme Court Failed to Protect Due Process Rights in State v. Loomis, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 75, 92 (2016) (citing due process concerns stemming from a defendant’s inability to “refute, supplement, and explain” the algorithm’s formula at sentencing and the lack of individualized sentencing in the process).
Columbia; Cook County, Illinois; Santa Cruz County, California; Allegheny County, Pennsylvania; Harris County, Texas; and Mecklenburg County, North Carolina.58 Kentucky, in particular, has been viewed as a national model in pretrial procedure,59 remaining at the forefront with its adoption of algorithmic approaches to bail. Many other jurisdictions, such as Mecklenburg County, have sought reform measures in an effort to address unresolved issues in their respective systems, such as jail overcrowding and the prospective costs of new housing facilities.60 Additionally, New York City has adopted the use of algorithms in multiple areas of its criminal justice system.61 City officials recently passed a bill to test its formulaic system for bias and to develop a process for citizens to request explanations of algorithmic decisions when they are dissatisfied with particular outcomes.62 This “open source” bill is believed to be

58 As of 2017, Kentucky, Arizona, and New Jersey were the only states to have implemented the Arnold Foundation’s Public Safety Assessment statewide. PRETRIAL JUST. INST., WHERE PRETRIAL IMPROVEMENTS ARE HAPPENING 4 (July 2017), https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/NCJA/c3320104-776e-4e0e-b687-4ffaf1d54e8c/UploadedImages/National%20Forum/2017%20Forum /fanno-burdeen-where-pretrial-improvements-2017.pdf.


62 An earlier version of the bill required “all agencies that perform algorithmic decision-making—from policing to public school assignments—make their code publicly available.” Id. at 61. Its final version requires a task force to develop a procedure which detects algorithmic bias to “determine whether an agency
one of the first of its kind and has been commended for its accessible ingenuity.63

However, not everyone is convinced that algorithmic procedure is the way of the future. As of 2015, fewer than ten percent of all jurisdictions had used a method of formal risk assessment when setting bail.64 Anne Milgram, former attorney general of New Jersey, explains that “[s]uch assessments are costly to conduct and are sometimes discounted by judges because they depend on information reported by defendants.”65 Other critics believe algorithms threaten the idea that people want judges who use their “life experience, common sense, and ethics” to guide their decision making rather than relying on a formula.66 Concerns over bias and discrimination have erupted with the implementation of algorithmic decision-making in other parts of the criminal justice process, namely at the sentencing stage.67 In light of these apprehensions toward the adoption of formulaic methodology to aid decision-making in the criminal justice system, the duty of proving the effectiveness of reform efforts falls to those jurisdictions that have already implemented algorithmic risk assessment into their bail determination process.

automated decision system disproportionately impacts persons [on an impermissible basis] . . .” Id.

63 See id.


65 Id. While the research and testing required to formulate such algorithms is extensive, tools such as the PSA can be implemented with minimal expense and even reduce costs in the long run by not requiring additional staff to conduct individual defendant interviews and enhancing judicial efficiency. ARNOLD FOUND., DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MODEL FOR PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT 4 (2013), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF-research-summary_PSA-Court_4_1.pdf.

66 See Klingensmith, supra note 51 (believing these algorithms to be compulsory, rather than a tool to supplement the common sense and experience of judicial officials).

III. THE PSA AND MECKLENBURG COUNTY

There has been a noticeable shift in approaches to bail procedure over the last decade, with many courts moving away from systems driven by rigid, offense-focused bail schedules in favor of “rigorous, scientific, data-driven risk assessments.” Among the jurisdictions at the forefront of utilizing risk assessment factors in its bail determination procedures is Mecklenburg County, the most populous county in North Carolina and home to the city of Charlotte. Due to its large population, Mecklenburg County demands a high degree of efficiency from its court system to ease the burden of overcrowded dockets and to ensure the fair and reasonable administration of justice. To achieve this goal, Mecklenburg County became one of the first jurisdictions in the country—and to date, the only jurisdiction in North Carolina—to adopt the Laura and John Arnold Foundation’s Public Safety Assessment tool (hereinafter referred to as the PSA). Since implementing the PSA, both defendants and the community of Mecklenburg County have experienced immensely positive results, demonstrating the benefits of algorithmic risk assessment in comparison to heavy reliance on traditional bail schedules corresponding to monetary constraints.

A. The PSA’s Approach to Bail Reform

The Laura and John Arnold Foundation is a philanthropic organization with a mission to “improve the lives of individuals by strengthening our social, governmental, and economic systems.” Arnold Foundation researchers compiled 1.5 million criminal cases

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69 See ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 4.
70 ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 10.
71 See ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 4; Brookland & Stasio, supra note 4 (discussing the decrease in jail population, increased efficiency of the court system, and extrinsic benefits to the community resulting from the PSA-Court’s utilization in Mecklenburg County).
gathered from approximately 300 different U.S. jurisdictions.\textsuperscript{73} From these cases, the Foundation’s research team studied 746,525 cases of defendants who had been released pretrial before their disposition.\textsuperscript{74} The initial analysis examined hundreds of factors including prior instances of failure to appear for court, drug and alcohol use, mental health, family relations, residency status, and employment history, among others.\textsuperscript{75} Researchers found that a small number of factors obtained at the administrative level could accurately predict a defendant’s risk level.\textsuperscript{76} Additionally, inclusion of factors relating to a defendant’s personal background gathered at an in-person interview with pretrial services resulted in no positive effect on the algorithm’s performance.\textsuperscript{77} Removing these factors from consideration created a methodical tool, derived from readily accessible administrative factors, that eliminated the need for costly, time-consuming pretrial interviews whose variables often inadvertently contribute to formulaic bias.\textsuperscript{78} The resulting algorithm produced two scores in line with those produced by the traditional factors courts use to evaluate pretrial detention, one predicting the defendant’s risk of flight and the other assessing the danger they pose to the community if released pending trial.\textsuperscript{79}

The PSA quantitates values for flight risk and safety of the community through the use of three separate risk assessment scales ranging from a low of one to a high of six.\textsuperscript{80} The first two scales represent “dangerousness predictions,” broken down into “new criminal activity” and “new violent criminal activity,” respectively.\textsuperscript{81} The third scale predicts the risk of a defendant’s

\textsuperscript{74} ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 65, at 3.
\textsuperscript{75} Id. at 3–4.
\textsuperscript{76} These administrative factors determined when the defendant is processed, mainly relating to information available from their criminal background history. Id.
\textsuperscript{77} See id. at 4.
\textsuperscript{78} See id.
\textsuperscript{79} See Gouldin, supra note 68, at 869.
\textsuperscript{80} See id. at 870.
\textsuperscript{81} Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“failure to appear.” The values assigned to each of these three scales are derived from a series of nine factors: whether the charged offense is violent, other pending charges, prior misdemeanor convictions, prior felony convictions, prior violent convictions, prior failure to appear pretrial within the last two years, prior failure to appear pretrial outside the last two years, prior convictions resulting in incarceration, and age at the time of arrest. None of these nine factors require individual defendant interviews as all are determined through administrative information capable of being automatically compiled prior to an initial bail hearing. The PSA’s creators claim the algorithm is “more objective, far less expensive, and requires fewer resources to administer than previous techniques.” Professor Laurny Gouldin, former Assistant Director of the Center for Research in Crime and Justice at New York University School of Law, has praised the algorithm, stating “[t]oo many of the federal and state risk assessment tools merge the analysis of flight risk and dangerousness into a single risk assessment calculation, the PSA-Court risk assessment tool being a notable exception.”

The Arnold Foundation also took steps to minimize algorithmic bias in the PSA risk assessment tool. Unlike many of the factors at issue with predictive policing algorithms, the PSA tool excludes variables involving race, gender, income, education, home address, history of drug use, family status, marital status, national origin, employment, or religion. Additionally, the Arnold Foundation stresses that the PSA analysis is not the only information a judge should consider when determining bail. The PSA is merely one of

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82 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
84 See Gouldin, supra note 68, at 870.
85 Id. (quoting ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 83).
86 Id. at 870–71.
87 See ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 83 (“The PSA provides information that is race- and gender- neutral. It helps . . . enhance fairness and efficiency in the system.”).
88 See Ferguson, supra note 52, at 265.
89 See ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 83.
90 See id.
several tools at a judge’s disposal to guide their decision-making process, with the goal of “increas[ing] safety, reduc[ing] taxpayer costs, and enhanc[ing] fairness and efficiency in the system.”

The PSA’s effectiveness as a risk assessment tool is best illustrated by comparing its outcomes to those produced by a traditional bail schedule. In North Carolina, it is statutorily required that the Senior Resident Superior Court Judge for each judicial district publish established bail policies to guide pretrial release. During the transition in which the PSA was first implemented in Mecklenburg County, the Bail Policy for the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District was revised to reflect the new methodology. The PSA matrix is specifically included in the policy, noting recommended action by taking both the flight risk of the defendant and the danger they pose to the community into consideration. The policy’s recommended bail schedule most acutely represents these changes when compared to other jurisdictions’ schedules within the state.

For example, suppose a young man with limited prior convictions is caught with a needle and heroin. The young man is then charged with possession of a Schedule I controlled substance, a Class I felony in North Carolina. Under Mecklenburg’s policy, the schedule recommends bail ranging from $0 to $25,000, more narrowly tailored after performing a PSA risk analysis. Because the defendant presents no danger to the community and limited risk of flight, he would likely be released on an unsecured bond or its equivalent pending trial, while also being afforded the opportunity

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91 Id.
93 Order Establishing Bail Policy for the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District, 14-R 1615, 1 (2014), https://www.mecknc.gov/CriminalJusticeServices/Documents/Mecklenburg%20County%20Bail%20Policy.pdf (outlining Mecklenburg County’s recommended monetary amounts and factors to be considered when determining conditions of release).
94 See id. at 22, Exhibit C.
95 Id. at 1.
97 Id. § 90-95(d)(1).
98 Order Establishing Bail Policy for the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District, supra note 93, at 16.
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to enroll in a drug rehabilitation program.\textsuperscript{99} This outcome changes dramatically when an individual under the same circumstances is charged with possession in a jurisdiction that has not adopted algorithmic risk assessment, such as Wake County, North Carolina. Under Wake County’s bail policy,\textsuperscript{100} it is recommended that the same defendant charged with a Class I felony be allocated a $2,000 to $10,000 secured bond as a condition of release.\textsuperscript{101} While the policy stipulates that these amounts are general guidelines for release,\textsuperscript{102} based upon the limited facts available at the initial bail determination hearing and a quick glance of the file only revealing “Possession of a Schedule I Controlled Substance,” this could easily lead a judicial official to impose the $2,000 recommended minimum. If this defendant cannot afford to pay a bail bonding company $200 for release,\textsuperscript{103} they will remain in custody pending trial, keeping them from receiving the drug treatment they need out of custody, all while the community pays to house them in an already overcrowded jail system.\textsuperscript{104} The above example demonstrates the equitable impact an algorithm-based risk assessment tool may have over jurisdictions relying on traditional bail schedules and determination methods.

However, despite the new implementations, conventional factors for determining release have not been completely eradicated from consideration under the Mecklenburg bail policy. In contrast to the risk assessment values used by the PSA, the bail policy maintains traditional variables for analyzing flight risk and community safety, which a judicial official must evaluate when


\textsuperscript{101} Id. at 6.

\textsuperscript{102} Id. at 5.

\textsuperscript{103} The cost of a bondsman charging an ordinary fee of ten percent for bail of $2000 would be $200. \textit{See} COHEN ET AL., \textit{supra} note 12, at 106.

\textsuperscript{104} See Fitzsimon, \textit{supra} note 60.
setting the terms for pretrial release.\textsuperscript{105} Many of the considered factors, such as subsection (C) of the Bail Policy for the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District, which regards “[t]he defendant’s family ties, employment, financial resources, character, and mental condition,”\textsuperscript{106} appear to undermine the solely administrative variables utilized by the PSA tool, functioning as proxies for the very race and gender bias the algorithmic approach seeks to eliminate.\textsuperscript{107} Nonetheless, while maintaining these factors may not appear ideal, their inclusion preserves the independent discretion of the judiciary while reinforcing the fact that the PSA is not a binding instrument but rather a resource to be used to form an appropriate and equitable assessment for conditions of release pending trial. The positive results Mecklenburg County has experienced from implementing the PSA speak to the powerful role algorithmic risk assessment tools may serve in bail reform efforts moving forward.

B. Implementation in Mecklenburg County and Positive Outcomes

Government officials in Mecklenburg County were faced with the prospect of reforming its bail system well over a decade before the PSA came into existence.\textsuperscript{108} From 1990 to 2008, Charlotte’s population grew at a rate of 70%, while the county’s jail population increased by 179%).\textsuperscript{109} The number of detained individuals led to a problem of jail overcrowding that existing housing facilities could not maintain long-term.\textsuperscript{110} This left the county with two options—construct new jail housing facilities to account for the increased detention rate, at an immense cost to the community,\textsuperscript{111} or implement

\textsuperscript{105} See Order Establishing Bail Policy for the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District, \textit{supra} note 93, at 2.
\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{107} See ARNOLD FOUND., \textit{supra} note 83.
\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Id.} at 1.
\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Id.} at 1–2.
\textsuperscript{111} The estimated construction and additional operating costs to meet baseline needs were broken down into three projections, totaling annual cost increases of
a series of policy measures to reduce the detention rate to a manageble level, including a revision of bail setting and pretrial release methodology. While attempts at reform were implemented, jail overcrowding remained a continuing problem in Mecklenburg County until the PSA was adopted in 2014.

Perhaps the most insightful source for assessing the effectiveness of the PSA and application of algorithmic bail procedures in Mecklenburg County is the group of judicial officials responsible for determining pretrial release. In June 2015, the Arnold Foundation interviewed Chief District Court Judge Regan Miller on his opinion of the PSA and its usefulness. Judge Miller began by questioning the fairness of the idea that “everybody charged with a certain crime was going to be initially started at a monetary bond at a certain amount” and the inequities experienced by defendants of limited means. Judge Miller continued by noting the negative effects experienced by defendants detained for more than two days, namely losing their jobs and members of their family and the community believing they are already guilty of the charges against them. Judge Miller commended the PSA for the information it provides, its objective fairness, and its function as a safeguard from judges being governed by their own implicit bias.

More recently, in a radio interview from December 2017, District Court Judge Elizabeth Trosch further emphasized the PSA’s benefits to both the defendants and the greater community. Judge Trosch articulated that in many local jails, while half of the defendants in custody have a low flight risk and are not a danger to the community, they remain detained “because they are unable to pay a money bond in order to secure their release.” This prevents

$38.6 million, $72.8 million, and $141.7 million through the years 2012, 2020, and 2030 respectively. Id. at 4.

112 See id. at 5–8.
113 See Brookland & Stasio, supra note 4; ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 10.
114 ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 4.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Brookland & Stasio, supra note 4.
119 Id.
these defendants from “go[ing] back to work and their families while their case is being processed in the court system.” A risk assessment tool such as the PSA provides a more targeted assessment of these factors tailored to the individual, rather than a more rigid, offense-driven system such as a traditional bail schedule, allowing judicial officials to reach a more efficient and equitable bail determination. In 2014, Mecklenburg County spent $113 million on inmate housing, roughly $166 per day per defendant—an amount Judge Trosch criticizes as “a lot of money to jail people who do not pose a serious threat to public safety.” According to Judge Trosch, by using the PSA for the past five years, Mecklenburg County has been able to safely reduce its jail population by approximately forty percent. The far-reaching benefits of the PSA are not just acknowledged by the judiciary but by other actors in the criminal justice system as well.

Prosecutors and defense attorneys alike support the effectiveness of the PSA. Former Mecklenburg County District Attorney Andrew Murray noted, “the risk assessment has allowed us to lower the number of the jail population [while] continu[ing] to lower the crime rate here in Mecklenburg County.” Like his colleagues on the bench, Mr. Murray observed the PSA offers value by promoting consistency amongst judges and by providing “something that is data-driven, that is not subjective.” Mr. Murray emphasized many of the same beneficial effects the tool has had on the system referenced by the county’s judicial officials such as tax savings to the community and the lack of the adverse consequences

120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.; see also ARNOLD FOUND., District Attorney Andrew Murray (June 2015), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/videos/district-attorney-andrew-murray/ (supporting the specific claim that the reduction has maintained safety).
123 See Dewan, supra note 64.
124 See id.; ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 122.
126 ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 122.
127 Id.
pretrial confinement imposes on defendants. Similarly, Mecklenburg County Public Defender Kevin Tully supports the PSA’s function in furthering bail reform efforts, believing the tool is not only useful for judicial officials but also benefits his attorneys on staff, allowing them to more effectively advocate on behalf of their indigent clients. Overall, the PSA has had a meaningful, lasting impact on Mecklenburg County’s bail procedure and has led to beneficial outcomes in every corner of the criminal justice system.

IV. THE ARGUMENT FOR AN ALGORITHMIC APPROACH TO BAIL REFORM

As of August 2017, the use of the PSA had expanded from its initial pilot sites and had been adopted in over two dozen jurisdictions throughout the United States. The Arnold Foundation expressed a goal in 2013 “that every judge in America will use a data-driven, objective risk assessment within the next five years.” Now, five years later, one must wonder why the majority of jurisdictions, including North Carolina’s other ninety-nine counties, have resisted change and remain entrenched in an archaic system of bail schedules rooted in monetary constraints.

A. Benefits to Defendants, the Criminal Justice System, and the Community

The benefits of an algorithmic bail system become apparent when examining the effects the PSA has had in Mecklenburg County. Traditional bail schedules impose financial limitations that often prevent an individual from obtaining release before trial.133

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128 See Dewan, supra note 64.
131 ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 65, at 5.
132 Brookland & Stasio, supra note 4 (emphasizing the positive effects experienced by both defendants and the community with the increased release of low risk individuals pending trial).
133 See Allen, supra note 7.
Many indigent defendants who pose neither a danger to public safety nor risk of flight nonetheless remain in custody, unable to turn to even a private bail bonding company for release.\textsuperscript{134} Algorithmic techniques benefit these individuals, who would otherwise be ineligible for release under a uniform, offense-focused bail schedule. Less time in custody translates to lower recidivism rates,\textsuperscript{135} likely because individual defendants spend less time behind bars exposed to more severe offenders.\textsuperscript{136} Additionally, defendants that spend less time behind bars can retain their jobs on release.\textsuperscript{137} Unemployment resulting from failure to report for work, or in response to notifying management of incarceration, makes individuals prone to reoffending as a result of financial necessity.\textsuperscript{138} Using algorithmic tools to emphasize the low risk a defendant poses to the community allows individuals who would otherwise remain detained under a traditional bail schedule to keep their jobs and care for their children while they await trial.

In addition to tangible benefits for defendants released pretrial, an algorithmic system promotes non-discriminatory procedural tools, ensuring constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process remain intact. In \textit{ODonnell v. Harris County},\textsuperscript{139} a federal district court granted a preliminary injunction barring the detention of indigent defendants charged with misdemeanors who remained in custody solely because of their inability to pay.\textsuperscript{140} In evaluating the county’s risk assessment tool, the court emphasized the issue by requiring an intermediate standard of “careful review,”\textsuperscript{141} as opposed

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{134} See Brookland & Stasio, \textit{supra} note 4.
\item \textsuperscript{135} See \textit{LOWENKAMP ET AL.}, \textit{supra} note 42.
\item \textsuperscript{136} See \textit{id.}
\item \textsuperscript{137} See \textit{ARNOLD FOUND.}, \textit{supra} note 4.
\item \textsuperscript{138} See \textit{id.}
\item \textsuperscript{139} \textit{ODonnell v. Harris Cty.}, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
\item \textsuperscript{140} See \textit{id.} at 1059. On the facts of the case, the federal district court concluded more than 100 individuals were detained in the Harris County Jail, who although were judicially found eligible for release, were prevented from doing so solely on the basis of their indigency. \textit{Id.} at 1116.
\item \textsuperscript{141} The opinion cites to the Supreme Court’s definition of “careful review” for wealth-based classifications, “requir[ing] a careful inquiry into such factors as ‘the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between legislative means and purpose, [and] the
to a rational basis standard, which is typically required for wealth-based classifications because of the individual liberty threatened by detention. The Fifth Circuit recently upheld the district court’s application of intermediate scrutiny, holding that, while “neither prisoners nor indigents constitute a suspect class . . . heightened scrutiny is required when criminal laws detain poor defendants because of their indigence.” The court’s heightened review of the county’s risk assessment practices demonstrates the importance of algorithmic bail procedures functioning as a tool to protect the accused’s right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Judicial efficiency is more important than ever given the continually stifled resources of the criminal justice system. The scope of efficiency created by algorithmic bail procedures is not limited to that experienced by judicial officials as a result of lower docket sizes but also allows prosecutors to more effectively manage caseloads, attorneys to more fervently advocate on behalf of their clients, and jail personnel to more easily monitor defendants while the case is pending. Having fewer defendants in custody significantly reduces safety concerns due to overcrowded jail populations, and also allows less severe cases to be resolved more productively. This eliminates the need to confine and transport defendants who have been detained for minor offenses, such as failure to pay a fine. All of these effects demonstrate the increased efficiency algorithmic techniques lend to bail procedure and the management of judicial resources.

existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose.”” Id. at 1137 (citing Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1983)).

142 See id. at 1134.
143 O’Donnell v. Harris Cty., 882 F.3d 528, 544 (5th Cir. 2018).
144 See Israel, supra note 44, at 761.
145 See id. at 765.
146 See id. at 763.
147 See id. at 778.
148 See Fitzsimon, supra note 60.
149 See id.
Moreover, the use of algorithms promotes public confidence in the justice system. Embracing more equitable methods of pretrial risk assessment backed by proven algorithmic procedure decreases the largely unchecked power the bail bonding industry has over defendants, reversing the privatization of individuals’ freedom and liberty and bringing these back into the scope of the public justice system. The increased fairness created through the use of these non-discriminatory factors promotes greater public confidence in the justice system as a result. Simultaneously, the safety of the community benefits by having a system focused on prosecuting more severe offenders in conjunction with the cost-savings of a reduced jail population. Jurisdictions must ask themselves if it makes sense to detain an individual for failure to pay a $150 fine when it costs the public $166 a day to house them.

B. Cautionary Measures: Accounting for Algorithmic Bias and Systemic Limitations

Notwithstanding the wide-ranging benefits of an algorithmic risk assessment system in determining bail, there are also pitfalls that must be avoided in utilizing the methodology. Removing personal bias from a mechanical algorithm does not necessarily make it “color-blind.” In 2016, an algorithm used in the Broward County, Florida, criminal justice system was found to have “wrongly labelled black people as future criminals nearly twice as

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150 For a discussion of how the perception of fairness functions as a central cornerstone of the criminal process, see Jerold H. Israel, Cornerstones of the Judicial Process, 2 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 20–21 (1993).
151 See COHEN ET AL., supra note 12, at 106.
152 See Israel, supra note 150.
153 See Israel, supra note 44, at 761 (describing the negative effects of an “overcrowded, overworked, [and] undermanned” justice system).
154 See Brookland & Stasio, supra note 4. This problem is bolstered by recent legislation making it more difficult for judges to waive court costs and fines for indigent defendants, resulting in their re-arrest for failure to comply. See Jennifer Brookland & Frank Stasio, The Unjust Legal System That Penalizes the Poor, WUNC (Feb. 15, 2018), http://wunc.org/post/unjust-legal-system- penalizes-poor#stream/0.
often as whites."

Race need not be explicitly written into an algorithm’s code to produce discriminatory and disproportionate results. Bias may result from pretrial release factors serving as proxies for other criteria such as poverty, as seen in examples including “whether a defendant has a working telephone, whether they live with a parent or spouse, and whether they’re employed in a training program.”

The threat of proxy variables has spurred concerns of algorithmic bias in other areas of the law as well. One such example is found between using discriminatory proxy variables in bail algorithms and the unlawful housing practice of redlining. From the 1930s through the 1960s, the U.S. Federal Housing Administration manipulated risk factor formulas to methodically exclude minority groups from obtaining loans in certain communities. Even creditworthy minority applicants were systematically denied their applications under the facially neutral policy simply because they resided in low-income areas. The inequitable practice was outlawed by the Fair Housing Act of 1968, but its chilling aftermath continues to manifest itself in large urban areas to this day.

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157 Abraham, supra note 61.


160 These formulas demonstrate the ability of an algorithm to be manipulated through the inclusion of “course data,” described as “digital noise [added] to the input data of the favoured group,” skewing results in their favor. Pearson, supra note 158.

161 See CORBETT-DAVIES ET AL., supra note 159.

the criminal justice context are just as vulnerable to the biased processes found in redlining. An inherent tension results in which efforts to minimize violent crime must be balanced with fair and equitable procedure. Risk assessment tools, such as the PSA, demonstrate that a “single-threshold rule” focused purely on administrative variables (as opposed to “race-specific thresholds”) can maximize public safety while simultaneously satisfying core constitutional principles of fairness in the judicial process.

Potential bias in algorithmic methods can indeed be limited. “Machines are trained to find patterns that predict future criminality from past data. They can therefore be told to find patterns that both predict criminality and avoid disproportionate false categorisation of . . . future offenders.” The true benefit of algorithms lies in the fact that “predictive software will only base its results on the formal factors that are coded into its system,” avoiding unconscious, implicit human bias in its decision-making capabilities. Proven algorithmic assessments like the PSA have been extensively tested to ensure a process of decision-making free from biased outcomes not meant to be “tweaked” by jurisdictions choosing to adopt them. Ensuring the software itself is free from biased proxies is crucial to the effective implementation of risk assessment algorithms in the criminal justice system.

Opponents claim algorithms impose limits on the open nature of the judicial process, pointing to the secrecy shrouding the proprietary makeup of certain formulas, particularly those used in the sentencing process. While this logic may apply to certain
portions of the judicial process, it is important not to rule out the use of risk assessments from every area. Some algorithms used in the sentencing phase have left defendants unable to examine the factors determining their fate, garnering due process and equal protection concerns from courts and scholars alike.\(^\text{171}\) However, in other contexts, such as predictive policing, concealing the variables comprising an algorithm may be necessary to prevent savvy criminals from working around its safeguard strategy. The use of algorithms in the context of bail procedure is separate and distinct from each of the above concerns. Unlike sentencing algorithms, bail algorithms such as the PSA are designed to be shared publicly and seek to offer universal application to the widest range of jurisdictions possible.\(^\text{172}\) While the adoption of these risk assessment tools is ultimately implemented by the legislature, their formulation by private research organizations dedicated to improving equity in the criminal justice system, in conjunction with police, judicial officials, and in some cases, the voting public, only furthers the value of an open, transparent bail reform policy benefiting both defendants and the community.

Bail algorithms are not yet a wholly perfect solution to resolving the conflicting principles at stake with pretrial release. In July 2017, a defendant in San Francisco was charged with the murder of a local photographer after being released by a judge pretrial for a separate offense on recommendation of his PSA score.\(^\text{173}\) Critics quickly attacked the tool following the tragedy.\(^\text{174}\) Chris Blaylock, a New Jersey bail bondsman and opponent of the Arnold Foundation, claimed the PSA’s “sole purpose is to promote the mass release of offenders with the least restrictive conditions possible regardless of

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\(^\text{171}\) See id. See generally Freeman, supra note 57 (arguing that courts need to ensure proper due process protection prior to using algorithms during sentencing).

\(^\text{172}\) See Schuppe, supra note 130.


\(^\text{174}\) See id.
the charges.”¹⁷⁵ Los Angeles Deputy District Attorney Eric Siddall raised concerns about the difficulty for judges to overturn decisions “couched in science,” noting fear of being overturned for keeping a defendant in custody.¹⁷⁶ In this instance, the non-profit organization Pretrial Diversion Project, who compiles the PSA analysis for the sheriff’s office, admitted to miscalculating the length of this defendant’s jail time producing an incorrect PSA score.¹⁷⁷ Tragedies such as this emphasize the need to maintain judicial discretion throughout the criminal process, accentuating that algorithms are simply another instrument in a judge’s arsenal to determine appropriate conditions of release pending trial. The overall effectiveness of algorithms serving as risk assessment tools is limited by the willingness of judicial officials to take the recommendations under advisement in conjunction with their own experience and understanding of the law. The commitment of early adopters is necessary to prove the effectiveness of risk assessment tools in practice, only increasing over time as technology develops, algorithms become increasingly automated, and human error is removed from the process.

C. Future Steps and Policy Measures in Pursuit of Reform

While avoiding bias in the process of implementing effective bail algorithms, courts and researchers alike can look to other areas of the criminal justice system, such as juvenile justice, for the best approach to putting these new policies into effect. When evaluating pretrial detention in the juvenile context, courts must consider non-monetary “community-based supervision strategies” that have results proven to lower recidivism, allow for more resources devoted to public safety, and reduce racial disparity in the process.¹⁷⁸ Applying these same strategies to the adult criminal system appears logical in light of continuing studies revealing adolescent maturity

¹⁷⁵ Id.
¹⁷⁶ Id.
¹⁷⁷ See id.
¹⁷⁸ PRETRIAL JUST. INST., supra note 58, at 9.
of the brain extends well into a child’s mid-twenties, particularly when “young adults aged 18-to-24 constitute 10 percent of the population but 30 percent of arrests.” Critics claim that these techniques, often centered around rehabilitative goals, are “soft on crime,” but the resulting effects are just the opposite. Rehabilitative approaches have been proven to reduce crime long term by providing young defendants the help they need and through individualized treatment and assessments, in addition to keeping a conviction off of their record that will follow them the rest of their lives. The rationale of these strategies can equally be applied to the adult criminal system, as rehabilitative pretrial programs outside of juvenile justice are already in effect in some jurisdictions. Much like algorithmic risk assessments, the pretrial procedures of the juvenile justice system are grounded in an assessment and strategy-based approach most appropriate for the individual defendant. A traditional bail schedule denoting particular monetary conditions for enumerated offenses only fosters recidivism among defendants who cannot afford release, jeopardizing public confidence in the criminal justice system as a whole.

Jurisdictions throughout the country are beginning to take notice of the value algorithms offer as tools aiding efforts to maintain the

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181 Id. (“[A]ccording to one study, 84 percent of young adults released from prison were rearrested within five years. Recidivism means more crime.”).
183 For example, North Carolina courts offer a conditional discharge program for first time drug offenders under North Carolina General Statute 90-96 in which an individual who completes a drug education class and satisfies other conditions imposed by the court has their charge dismissed without a conviction on their record. N.C. DRUG EDUC. SCH., supra note 99, at 1–2.
balance of cases proceeding efficiently in court and keeping communities safe. In May 2015, Chief Justice Mark Martin of the North Carolina Supreme Court formed the North Carolina Commission on the Administration of Law and Justice, tasked with evaluating the state’s court system and making recommendations for reforming the judicial process “within the existing administrative framework.” The Commission’s Final Report, released in March 2017, recommended the statewide adoption of various reform methods—including the endorsement of the PSA—largely due to the algorithm’s successful implementation in Mecklenburg County. These reform measures have not been limited to the state arena but are beginning to take effect at the federal level as well. Senators Kamala Harris (D-CA) and Rand Paul (R-KY) have drafted bipartisan legislation with the central goals of “ensuring that no-one is detained simply because they are poor, and restoring a presumption of release for most defendants.” The proposed legislation seeks to achieve these goals through the use of algorithm-based risk assessment tools, such as the PSA, with the Senators claiming the added benefit of “restor[ing] Americans’ faith in our justice system.”

V. CONCLUSION

A leading authority on criminal law and procedure, Professor Jerold Israel has identified a series of nine “cornerstone

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188 Professor Jerold Israel is a graduate of Yale Law School, two-term Supreme Court law clerk to Justice Potter Stewart, and author of the book Modern Criminal Procedure, 12th ed. See Israel, Jerold H., U. MICH. L. SCH.,
objectives” embodying the “basic structure and the governing legal principles” of the judicial process. Among these cornerstones, three emerge as encapsulating the values pretrial detention hearings seek to accomplish: “Respecting the Dignity of the Individual,” “Maintaining the Appearance of Fairness,” and “Achieving Equality in the Application of the Process.” Risk assessment algorithms seek to further these three goals by correcting inequities present in the traditional bail schedule relying on imposed monetary conditions in order to function as intended. Defendants who neither pose a danger to the public safety nor risk of flight are identified as such. They are then released to their families and permitted to return to their jobs in lieu of remaining in custody at the expense of the taxpayer.

Despite the pronounced benefits of an algorithm-based bail determination process, many jurisdictions remain slow to embrace the reformed methodology in favor of the outdated procedures. They may be wary of a loss of discretion in the hands of their judges, or perhaps concerned with the notion of a formula systematically identifying groups of people as future offenders of criminal activity. The reality is that algorithms function as tools for judges to use in order to most effectively protect their communities while ensuring compliance with the criminal justice system. Bail reform legislation has been successful as a result of “a growing awareness that too many low-risk defendants stay behind bars because they are poor while too many dangerous defendants exploit the money bail system and are released with little to no supervision.” When implemented correctly through data-driven, proven analysis, risk assessment algorithms provide an answer to the question of how to correct the present inequities that exist in the traditional method of following a bail schedule corresponding to the offense committed and not the individual being detained.


189 Israel, supra note 150, at 5.
190 Id. at 19–21.